Tag: Deleuze

Byung-Chul Han

The French philosopher Gilles Deleuze once said: “There is no need to fear or hope, but only to look for new weapons.”

‘Weapons’ may give us the wrong associations, but what he refers to are concepts that, like a brick, can be used to destroy what is hindering the growth of our lives, and at the same time, help us build or create something sustainable.

The Burnout Society

The Korean philosopher Byung-Chul Han’s work can be seen a toolbox aimed at helping us understand our contemporary society, while also presenting us with concrete ideas, thoughts or ‘weapons’ that might help us overcome or resist our own weak desires and vanities.

Han was born in Seoul, South Korea in 1959. He studied metallurgy in Korea before moving to Germany in his early twenties to study philosophy, German and theology. Today, Han is a professor at the University der Künste in Berlin. His initial fame sprang up with the publication of his book Müdigkeitsgesellschaft (2010), which, directly translated, means ‘the fatigue society.’ In English, this was cleverly translated to The Burnout Society (2015).

Han’s thesis is that today’s neoliberalism has made politics psychological or mental. The logic of neoliberalism has invaded our minds. It’s our ability to be present in our lives, to think and to love that is threatened by this invasion. Neoliberalism—for many, at least—has become an uninvited guest that refuses to leave our minds.

Han declares, in all of his work, that we have become narcissistic. For this reason, it’s time for citizens to care more about society’s welfare than their own egos. “Responsibility for the community defines citizens. Consumers lack responsibility, above all,” Han writes in his 2018 book, In the Swarm: Digital Prospects. The result of this narcissistic development is well-known: stress, burnout and depression. “Depression is a narcissistic malady,” Han states in The Agony of Eros (2017).

Eros or love is the only thing that may conquer our contemporary depression. As Han writes, “Depression represents the impossibility of love.”

Experiencing sublime beauty hurts

Still, it’s difficult to love, because we are not really free. It’s not just that society pressures us to fit in, perform faster and achieve more, but rather that we ourselves want this. We try to appear as positive, smooth and shiny in public as possible, as if our lives are all made up of ‘good vibes.’

In 2017’s Saving beauty, Han writes: “The smooth is the signature of the present time.” This kind of smoothness, he continues, “connects the sculptures of Jeff Koons, iPhones and Brazilian waxing.”

Today, smoothness and waxed bodies, quite sadly, are seen as the same thing as beauty. The morale behind this is clear: Smooth, smoother, smoothest = good, better, best. All that is strange, secret, or negative—in other words, all that passes through our thoughts—disappears, due to the ongoing repetition of sameness.

We lack a critical yet creative and life-affirming approach to overcoming this confinement. When we avoid the negative, the difficult and the painful, we amputate life. Our lives tend to circle around ourselves, making the circle smaller and smaller as we Google ourselves into unconsciousness.

To contrast this shallow development, Han turns to the writings of Plato, Kant, Hegel and Heidegger, in which there is no distinction between beauty and the sublime. Experiencing sublime beauty is not supposed to be pleasurable; rather, it hurts. It makes you fall and stumble. It is similar to falling in love, because you can lose yourself and act rather stupid.

“The sight of beauty does not cause pleasure, but shocks,” Han stresses in Saving beauty. It’s the matter of experiencing our own fragility that contemporary society minimizes. Art can shake us, make us see the world differently and help us perceive our own limitedness and flaws. “The longing for beauty,” Han says, “is ultimately the longing for a different mode of being, for another, altogether non-violent form of life.”

The strength of Han’s analysis lies in how he uses two guiding concepts in all his books: freedom and power. They both encapsulate the problem with contemporary society and can also open us up to alternative ways of living our lives.

Truth is freedom

Freedom is both a problem and a possibility. It is becoming, emphasizing that we become by combining courage to stand up against dominating ideals and norms with the belief that things could be different. Freedom is found in becoming whatever disobeying those ideals enables us to become. Real freedom is socially anchored, and as Han says in Psychopolitics: Neoliberalism and New Technologies of Power (2017): “Freedom is a synonym for the community that succeeds.”

By making freedom social, he tries to relate it with truth. Perhaps this is where Han shows how courageous he is, by reintroducing the problematic concept of truth in philosophy. In Saving beauty, he speaks about the need to save beauty. Why? Because, as he writes: “Beauty promises freedom and reconciliation,” and “truth is freedom.”

In other words, a world of smoothness is false. It’s a world of ‘post-truth.’ For Han, the beautiful is both true and good; it’s almost as though the Korean philosopher is turning Platonic. And he is—at least in the way that the French philosopher Alain Badiou is Platonic.

In both Saving beauty and The Agony of Eros, Han ends up advocating for Badiou’s idea that the task of philosophy is to be loyal or faithful towards whatever binds us together (what is true, in other words). Han distinguishes himself from Badiou when he more practically shows why or how we can show fidelity to what really takes place in our lives.

Fidelity is unconditional in that it presupposes commitment and awareness. That means we should try to become capable of matching all parts of life, instead of just doing so when life is pleasurable and smooth.

“The saving of beauty is the saving of that which commits us.” This loyal commitment or involvement is related to the kind of awareness that mindfulness cultivates, as a non-judgmental and kind approach to what is happening now and here.

Without humour, no freedom. Without freedom, no love.

Han also uses his Eastern roots in his philosophical thinking. Back in 2002, when he was still an unknown, he published a book called The Philosophy of Zen-Buddhism.

In this book, he illustrates that the Buddhist concept of ‘nothingness’—as the absence of an exclusive subjectivity—is what makes Buddhism pacifistic and non-violent, because there is no essence where power can be concentrated. Also, the concept of ‘emptiness’ is the reason why narcissism is something very un-Buddhist. There is no unchangeable ‘me’ in the mirror; rather, I am being formed by life.

The Korean thinker also illustrates that humour is something that links Western and Eastern philosophy. Nietzsche, for example, claimed that laughing was an expression of freedom. The Danish philosopher Søren Kierkegaard once said that “freedom is the element of love,” so it follows that without humour, there’s no freedom, and without freedom, there’s no love. Or to put it differently, it’s difficult to love people who never laugh, or take themselves too seriously.

In Buddhism, Han writes, there is no miracle, only hard daily work: Letting go of the past and not transcending or dreaming of a world beyond this one. He compares Buddhism with walking. Walking has no future, as you’re always in the midst of walking. To die means to walk, he says, emphasizing that we are always dying. Similarly, Michel de Montaigne said that to philosophize is to die.

‘Dying’ means always walking, philosophizing, exploring and experimenting with life, not as a way of meeting a specific objective, but as a way of being grounded in the here and now. Western and Eastern philosophy, I believe, share this humble approach to life. We never philosophize or meditate to conquer the world, but to praise its beauty.

Listening as an art of breathing

Many Eastern ideas are reflected in Han’s suggestions for how to overcome today’s stress, burnout, exhaustion and ever-growing narcissism. For instance, in The Burnout Society, he encourages us to stop, sit down and take a break. Philosophy is here defined as ‘an intervening time,’ ‘a time of ‘non-doing,’ ‘a peace time,’ as he calls it.

The concept of ‘non-doing’ resembles elements of Buddhism and mindfulness in that it stresses that we don’t need to be doing things constantly, Rather, non-doing allows things to unfold at their own pace.

Similarly, in The Transparency Society (2015), Han proposes that although we are forced or coerced into participating in an ongoing style of positive communication—declaring, “I like,” over and over, again and again—we don’t have to like everything. It’s not more communication that is needed, but creative or alternative approaches to living a richer life. To be creative, a person needs to stop and allow themselves to be formed or touched by what is happening as it happens, in the here and now, without judging it according to some predefined ideal.

A last example is provided in Psychopolitics, in which Han he reawakens the ‘philosophical idiot’ as a way out of today’s malady. The idiot doesn’t belong to a specific network or alliances, so he or she is free to choose. The idiot doesn’t communicate; instead, he or she facilitates a space of silence and loneliness, where they only say what deserves to be said. The idiot listens, as a generous way of stepping aside to give room to the others.

“The art of listening takes place as an art of breathing,” Han writes in The Expulsion of the Other: Society, Perception and Communication Today (2018).

For non-philosophers alike

Han’s work is accessible for non-philosophers, and is a good guide to understanding and navigating oneself through today’s demanding, achievement-based society. He encourages us to Relax. Do nothing. Become no one. See time as something peaceful.

Time passes, whether we want it or not. Then it returns and changes everything. Let go. Listen. Embrace moments of non-communication. And breathe.

Rethinking Ethics in Psychology

Ethics is always about values. In psychology, as in most professions, students are often taught to approach ethics through three frameworks: 

  1. Virtue ethics (What kind of person should I be?)
  2. Deontology (What duties must I follow?)
  3. Utilitarianism (What outcome will maximize the good?)

Each offers a way of defining “the good.” These approaches remain useful, helping psychologists clarify responsibilities, make difficult decisions, and justify their reasoning. Yet each framework risks being used as a strategic, rhetorical tool to back a predetermined position. The same action can be rationalized as duty, optimal outcome, or virtue, shifting the focus from genuine ethics to self-justification. 

What if we made attention—the genuine act of perceiving and staying present in situations—the starting point of ethics, rather than rules or outcomes?

Ethics as Attention

The philosopher Simone Weil wrote, “Attention is the rarest and purest form of generosity.” For Weil, paying attention is already an ethical act. It means suspending assumptions long enough to notice what is truly happening. This matters as much in the consulting room as in the classroom. 

A psychologist who pays close attention can tell when silence means something, when irritation masks fear, or when something important goes unsaid. No code of ethics tells you how to respond in these moments. Paying attention is the ethical act. In contrast, when we rely too heavily on abstract frameworks, we risk skipping over this important stage of perception. We rush to categorize, justify, or resolve. Ethics then becomes about defending an action rather than sensing what a situation is calling for. 

To clarify the distinction: morality is about judgment—applying universal principles consistently. Ethics, as I am proposing, focuses on responsiveness—actively perceiving a specific situation and considering how best to respond. Morality asks, “What should I do in general?” Ethics asks, “What is happening here, and how can I respond now?” This shift seems small, but it is significant. Morality gives answers and often shuts down possibilities. Ethics, as attention, keeps things open and starts with not knowing. Psychologists need this, because much of their work happens in situations without easy answers.

The Problem of Comparison

Professional psychology education often focuses on outcomes and comparisons: Who has the most clients? Whose intervention is “evidence-based”? Who secures the most funding? Accountability matters, but this culture of comparison can narrow our focus. We start to value what is visible, measurable, and ranked. This comes at the expense of the subtler textures of human life. In therapy, this pressure can lead clinicians to measure “progress” only by symptom checklists. They may miss the more fragile forms of growth—such as trust, presence, and shared silence—that defy easy measurement. When ethics becomes only compliance or output, it grows too thin. It cannot handle the complexity of real psychological life.

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Small Practices of Ethical Attention

What might it look like to cultivate ethics as attention in psychology? Here are some simple practices:

  • Reflective journaling: After sessions, clinicians can note what was said, what they felt, what they avoided, or what unsettled them. Attention grows by noticing what escapes immediate explanation.
  • Naming subtle ruptures: Instead of ignoring the slight withdrawal of a client or the tension in a supervision meeting, name it gently: “I noticed some silence after I said that—what was it like for you?”
  • Suspending judgment: Rather than deciding too quickly what a behavior “means,” stay with the ambiguity: “Something feels important here, but I’m not sure yet what it is.”

These are not alternatives to ethical codes. They are complements. Codes set the minimum. Attention sustains the depth.

Becoming Present

For psychologists, ethics means more than preventing harm or avoiding misconduct. It means being present with the people and situations you face. It means noticing when something matters, even if no rule was broken. 

Ethics is about more than compliance; it is about who we are becoming. It challenges us to ask not just “What should I do?” but “Who am I becoming through my actions?”

Læsegruppe: Tusind plateauer af Gilles Deleuze & Félix Guattari

Start: tirsdag 30. september 2025
Tid: 16.30–18.00
Varighed: 10 sessioner (med to pauser undervejs)
Pris: 950 kr.
Underviser: Finn Janning

Hvorfor læse Tusind plateauer?

Deleuze & Guattaris Tusind plateauer (1980) er en af det 20. århundredes mest radikale og udfordrende filosofiske værker. Teksten bevæger sig på tværs af filosofi, politik, psykologi, kunst og biologi – og insisterer på at tænke i bevægelse, i netværk, i forbindelser.

At læse den alene kan være overvældende. At læse den i fællesskab åbner for samtale, fortolkning og nye måder at forbinde sig til teksten på.

Struktur og form

  • Hver session begynder med et kort oplæg af Finn Janning, der introducerer dagens plateau.
  • Derefter arbejder vi i fællesskab – først evt. i mindre grupper, siden samlet.
  • Målet er ikke at nå til en endegyldig forståelse, men at åbne teksten, finde forbindelser og tænke på kryds og tværs.
  • Sessionerne optages, så du kan se eller gense, hvis du går glip af en aften.

Program

Session 1 – 30. september
Introduktion til Deleuze & Guattari + Plateau 1: Rhizome
(fri uge 7. oktober – læsetid)

Session 2 – 14. oktober
Plateau 2: 1914: En enkelt ulv eller flere
Plateau 3: 10.000 f.Kr.: Moralens geologi
(fri uge 21. oktober – læsetid)

Session 3 – 28. oktober
Plateau 4: 20 november 1923 — Lingvistikkens postulater
Plateau 5: 587 f.Kr.– Om nogle tegnregimer

Session 4 – 4. november
Plateau 6: November 28, 1947 – Hvordan laver man sig et legeme uden organer?
Plateau 7: År 0: Ansigtsmæssighed

Session 5 – 11. november
Plateau 8: 1874: Tre noveller eller ‘Hvad er der sket?´
Plateau 9: 1933: Mikropolitik og segmentaritet

Session 6 – 18. november
Plateau 10: 1730: Intensblivelse, dyreblivelse, uopfatteligblivelse!

Session 7 – 25. november
Plateau 11: 1837: Om omkvædet

Session 8 – 2. december
Plateau 12: 1227: Afhandling om nomadologi: Krisgmaskinen

Session 9 – 9. december
Plateau 13: 7000 f.Kr.: Opfangelsesapparat
Plateau 14: Det glatte og det stribede

Session 10 – 16. december
Plateau 15: Konklusion: Konkrete regler og abstrakte maskiner

  • opsamling og fælles samtale

Praktisk

  • Pris: 950 kr. for hele forløbet.
  • Tidspunkt: tirsdage kl. 16.30–18.00.
  • Sted: Via zoom.
  • Vi anvender Niels Lyngsøs oversættelse fra 2005, udgivet af Det Kongelige Danske Kunstakademi Billedkunstskoler.
  • Tilmelding: via kontaktform nedenfor

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A Philosophy of Attention for Authentic Performance

This study presents a philosophy of attention that promotes authentic performance. As described here, attention is about training outgoing and ingoing attention skills, which can ultimately connect an individual to others and the world. This ability can help the individual remain focused and receptive to what happens while at the same time accepting their thoughts, feelings, and experiences. The ability to pay attention is crucial to performing and living authentically, regardless of the person’s area of expertise. The philosophy of attention presented here is rooted in existential philosophy, flow psychology, mindfulness, and acceptance-based psychology. It aims to help individuals and organizations examine what they can do and how they can actualize their potential more freely and with greater clarity. This results in better performance and increased existential meaningfulness and joy, leading to a more dignified life.

Read the entire paper in Meta: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy.

All I Want for Christmas Is …

Yes, Santa Claus exists, though perhaps not in the way many might initially think. The word “illusion” need not be understood as something false or deceitful. Rather, I propose that illusions are not false but instead possess a reality within their influence.

Allow me to clarify. I do not believe the world is a fixed, given entity. Nor do I believe in unchangeable certainties, aside from the inevitable reality of death. I challenge the reduction of empiricism to only what can be observed, weighed, or measured—to objects like chairs or tables, or distances calculated between them. Instead, I align with the French philosopher Gilles Deleuze, who argued that what we call “empirical” encompasses not only physical entities but also subjective phenomena: thoughts, hallucinations, or images. In this sense, illusions operate as forces within the real, enhancing and enriching our world.

Consider this perspective: Harry Potter, Santa Claus, unicorns, or flying dragons exist. Their existence is not confined to their physical presence but is affirmed by their capacity to shape understanding and evoke imagination. Harry Potter is as real as black holes. Or take money—a seemingly mundane piece of paper or a digital figure in your bank account. It derives its power from belief. I can exchange a five-Euro note for six beers or three roses because society collectively agrees upon its value. In this way, money is as real as Santa Claus. For many children, writing a letter to Santa Claus or waking to find gifts under the tree validates his presence. By participating in these rituals, parents indirectly confirm his existence.

The question of whether the world is an illusion taps into metaphysical considerations—a metaphysics of being versus one of becoming. As philosopher Karl Popper suggested, metaphysical questions cannot be conclusively proven. Instead, they are answered in ways that are more or less convincing, based on experience—an experience that can include illusions or hallucinations as valid phenomena.

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Practically speaking, our metaphysical stance has consequences. A rigid belief in a fixed, predetermined world often fosters a binary mindset: true versus false, right versus wrong. This rigidity may contribute to the divisive tendencies we observe in identity politics, moral exclusivity, and ideological fanaticism.

In contrast, a metaphysics of becoming is more dynamic and humble. It recognizes that potential, movement, hallucinations, and illusions are integral to shaping reality. They actualize possibilities, offering new ways to see and understand the world. Illusions, in this framework, are as impactful as science in driving change and innovation. For example, envisioning a flying car or a utopian society begins with imagining the seemingly impossible.

If life cannot be fully owned or grasped—as I believe—then our task is to create space for that which enriches and animates existence. Illusions, then, are not distractions or deceptions. They are vital forces that compel us to question, explore, and expand what is real.

So, when Mariah Carey sings, “Santa, won’t you bring me the one I really need?”she touches on something profound. It’s not merely a plea for love; it’s an invocation of the transformative power of belief. Santa Claus, like love, hope, and imagination, is as real as we allow him to be. He exists not in the fixed world of objects but in the dynamic realm of possibilities. Through such illusions, we shape our world and make it brighter, fuller, and richer.

First published in Psychology Today

Nietzsche og filosofien

Filosofien foregriber fremtidens tanker og måder at eksistere på. Uden foregribelsen ville filosofien være reduceret til en refleksion, en kommentar simpelthen.

Den franske filosof Gilles Deleuze (1925–1995) sagde, at filosofi er lig med kunsten at fremstille begreber, der overkommer det problem, som begrebet viser tilbage til. 

I bogen Nietzsche og filosofien fra 1962 viser Deleuze, hvordan filosofien er problematiserende og skabende, tolkende og vurderende. Han gør det ved at tænke med eller i forlængelse af den tyske filosof Friedrich Nietzsches begreber. 

Nietzsche og filosofien er netop udkommet på dansk, oversat af Robert Morsing Thyssen og udgivet af Multivers. 

Værdier og vurderinger

”Nietzsches overordnede projekt er at indføre begreberne mening og værdi i filosofien,” skriver Deleuze på første side.

Værdibegrebet indebærer en kritik. Det er nemlig uklart, hvorvidt en vurdering forudsætter værdier eller, omvendt, om værdier forudsætter en vurdering. Problemet er selve vurderingen. Den er ikke knyttet til værdier, men eksistensformer eller væremåder for dem, der dømmer og vurderer. Det betyder, at vi altid har ”de overbevisninger, følelser, tanker som vi fortjener i henhold til vores måde at være på.” 

Hvilke overbevisninger, følelser og tanker har mennesket? 

Ifølge Nietzsche er svaret, at ressentiment (et hadefuldt begær efter hævn), dårlig samvittighed og nihilisme udgør princippet for det menneskelige væsen. Det lyder hverken sundt eller glædeligt. 

Problemet, som Nietzsche adresserer, er, at visse tankesystemer og ideologier har gjort mennesket reaktivt og sygt. Filosofien har forsømt det levende, livet, kroppene, følelserne. 

Som modspil tilbyder Nietzsche en anden sensibilitet, der formår at begribe livet på dets egne tilblivelsesprincipper, hvorved livets kompleksitet og pluralisme ikke reduceres. I stedet for en reaktiv attitude, der siger nej til livet, plæderer Nietzsche for en aktiv ja-sigen til livet.

At sige ja til livet er at vurdere det ud fra sin egen forskel i livet – på livets præmisser. ”At sige ja er ikke at bebyrde sig, at påtage sig det værende, men at befri, at sætte det levende fri (…) ikke at belaste livet med vægten af højere værdier, men at skabe nye værdier som er livets værdier, som gør livet let og aktivt (…) opfinde nye former for liv,” skriver Deleuze. 

Der er tale om en tænkning, der vil gå til det yderste af det, som livet kan. 

Livet hæmmes på grund af dårlig tænkning, der kommer til udtryk i tre fejlagtige teser: 

  1. Tænkeren som en der vil og elsker det sande, 
  2. at kroppen, følelserne og det sanselige, leder tanken væk fra sandheden, endelig 
  3. ideen om en metode til at tænke. 

Nietzsche om vilje til magt

Den tænkning, som Nietzsche skaber, handler om at opdage og opfinde nye muligheder for livet. ”Livet gør tænkningen til noget aktivt, tænkningen gør livet til noget affirmativt.” Han vil tænke med livets kræfter, bringe livets kræfter på begreb. Og det er her, at han skaber begreber såsom ”Vilje til magt”, ”den evige gentagelse” og ”Overmennesket” m.fl. 

Jeg vil her kun beskæftige mig med viljen til magt, der ikke betyder, at viljen vil have magt. ”Magt er det, der vil i viljen (…) Viljen er gennem magten selv en menings- og værdiskabende kraft.” 

Viljen til magt bekæmper den ”middelmådighed” i tænkning, der tolker og vurderer fænomener ud fra reaktive kræfter, f.eks. hvor hver nation, køn, hudfarve og seksualitet kun formår at bekræfte sig selv gennem negationen af den anden.

Nietzsche og Deleuze er affirmative tænkere, der overleverer betingelserne for liv. De gør filosofien til en kunst. Kunsten at fortolke og vurdere

Dette er dialektismens problem. Den formår ikke at tænke livets forskelligheder, tilblivelser og kræfter, men reducerer tanken til en værens form, der er ren og tom. Dialektikeren ”siger ja til sig selv ved at slå over i sin egen modsætning.” 

Dens ja-sigen udspringer af konsekvensen af en negativ præmis: Jeg er god, hvorfor de andre må være onde. Eller omvendt. 

”Dumhed,” skriver Deleuze, ”er en struktur i tænkningen som sådan (…) en lav måde at tænke på.” Der er ingen livskraft til stede, når livet belastes ”med de tungeste byrder”: væren, sandhed og virkeligheden, der holder livet fanget. Det kunne være et menneske, der forsegler sin egen identitet til en bestemt væren, sandhed og virkelighed. Nietzsches filosofi bryder med sådanne eksistentielle fængsler. Her inviteres mennesket til at finde sin egen vej.

Den lave måde at tænke på strider mod viljen til magt. Viljen til magt er bundet til evnen til at lade sig påvirke, en forstærket sensibilitet. Nietzsche taler om en følelse af magt, som forudsætter, at den anden, det anderledes og forskellige, ikke negeres. Tværtimod, så indoptages forskellige kræfter som en undersøgelse af, hvad der også er muligt, hvad livet også kan blive.

Det handler ikke om sandhed

Nye læsere af Nietzsche vil hurtigt se, hvor relevant han er i dag. Det er ikke et ukendt fænomen, at flere dømmer andre i forhold til belejlige identitetskasser, hvorfra livet kan anklages, fordi det ikke passer ind i ens egen meningsfigur. 

Nietzsches kritik er hård, men også opløftende. Han nærer en tiltro til menneskets skaberkraft. Han siger, at det er vigtigt at have en forståelse for, at mange reaktive tiltag kommer til udtryk gennem vedtægter og love, der begrænser en masse menneskers frihed og vilje til skabelse. Ofte sker disse tiltag som en slags kompensation for historiske uligheder, hvorved nye uligheder skabes. 

Nietzsche opfinder en genealogi, der både betyder oprindelsens værdi og værdiernes oprindelse. Meningen er aldrig givet på forhånd, den afhænger af de kræfter, der overtager den. Meningsbegrebet er komplekst og pluralistisk. 

At fortolke og vurdere er et spørgsmål om afvejning, hvorfor filosofiens ”fintfølende men strenge kunst” er den ”pluralistiske fortolkning.” Det handler ikke om sandhed, men vurderingen af det, som sker for derigennem at skabe nye former for liv.

Nietzsche og Deleuze er affirmative tænkere, der overleverer betingelserne for liv. De gør filosofien til en kunst. Kunsten at fortolke og vurdere. 

Jeg har læst Nietzsche og filosofien, som gik jeg med Nietzsche i den ene hånd og Deleuze i den anden. De har, som var jeg et barn, løftet mig op undervejs, mens jeg har skreget af glæde. For det er en glæde, at flere nu kan genvinde en tro på verden og livet, mens de finder modet til at skabe nye former for liv. 

Anmeldelsen blev første gang bragt i POV International

Life is not personal

What if life is impersonal?

In the book The Identity Trap, political scientist Yascha Mounk argues how some ideas (or his interpretations hereof) are causing new forms of polarization, separatism, control, and even repression.

The identity trap, according to Mounk, refers to those people and institutions that prioritize identity over universalism–especially when specific identity categories like race, gender, and sexual orientation are favored. 

The book is filled with illustrative examples from the US of “progressive separatism” and “strategic essentials”, claiming to be for equality while not treating all people as equals.

Yet, some of Mounk’s claims regarding the cause of the emergence of identity politics require a comment.

Foucault & Deleuze

For example, Mounk writes: “Many postcolonial scholars were especially aghast when Foucault, in his exchange with Deleuze, argued that the oppressed do not need intellectuals to speak on their behalf.”

Mounk refers to the French philosophers Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze, who in 1972 discussed the struggles of women, homosexuals, and prisoners, as well as the relationship between theory, practice, and power.

In their conversation, they try to break away from the idea that the intellectual “spoke the truth to those who had yet to see it, in the name of those who were forbidden to speak the truth,” as Foucault says. Instead of claiming to speak the truth or have privileged access to it as intellectuals, Foucault and Deleuze discuss “the necessity” for individuals “to speak for themselves.” In continuation, Deleuze stresses: “Who speaks and acts? It is always a multiplicity, even within the person who speaks and acts… Representation no longer exists.”

Representation no longer exists, how should this postulate be understood?

First, each human being is never one fixed being or belongs to one identity group but is a multiplicity. Therefore, a focus on identity that is too rigid is a trap because it imprisons thought. In continuation, no one can speak on behalf of a person or a group because each person or group already is a multiplicity; or, if you should speak on behalf, you speak in several voices, precisely what identity-based politics rarely master, for example, due to strategic essentialism.

In his philosophy, Deleuze operates with an ontology of difference and repetition, where identity manifests after encounters. Deleuze would find it imprisoning to want a particular identity–that is, to restrict thinking to essential forms of being, whether referring to races, ethnicities, sexualities, etc. Thus, he, too, would be against the identity trap, although with different arguments.

To become with life

For example, part of the current focus on identity is trying to undermine the old dominant social order, or what Deleuze and Guattari would call the majority of being “white, male, adult, ‘rational,’ etc.; in short, the average European, the subject of enunciation.” Still, Deleuze and Guattari don’t tear down a dominant system by changing one ideal or one dominating identity with another. The problem is not that it is a man who is white, etc., but that a specific identity is favored over another, that some forms of life are worth more than others. Mounk addresses this problem and shows how the US, in several contexts, favors non-whites, i.e., discriminates. (He gives examples of the distribution of COVID-19 medicine, access to some schools, and certain groups having access to startup help). 

The problem, however, is not male versus female or black versus white, according to Deleuze and Guitar, because everyone should be equally treated, just as there ought to be room for all life forms. The problem is that we think and add authority to specific identities. Add authority to particular identities. Therefore, they suggest becoming imperceptible and impersonal–or simply forgetting about all these identity markers that become a prison. The current urge to seek an identity hinders people’s capacity to think for themselves. Hindering people to become with life.

For Deleuze, what is strange and unfamiliar makes a person think. For example, in the 1970s, Deleuze was active in the early French gay rights movement. He was a member of the group FHAR (Front Homosexuel d’action Révolutionnaire). For some, it might appear strange that a husband and father of two would care for other people’s rights, but why? Due to empathy, imagination, and selflessness, connecting with people different from yourself is possible. For example, you can fight for education even if you have no children or health care, even if you are not sick. This is trivial, yet for some, unfortunately, it is not due to selfishness or progressive separatism (nationalism is an example).

Another argument in favor of Deleuze is that his philosophy moves away from a philosophy of being towards one of becoming. Yet, becoming is not about the point from which something originates or the point at which it arrives. With this, Deleuze would agree with Mounk’s critique against “strategic essentialism” and “progressive separatism.”

Identities are fiction

In A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and the psychoanalyst Félix Guattari write: “A becoming is always in the middle; one can only get it by the middle.” Becoming, therefore, does not represent an ideal, a norm, or a reference point. On the contrary, becoming produces new ways of living, sensibilities, and relating to things such as race, gender, or sexuality where everything intersects. No race or sexuality is prioritized for another.

To emphasize the strength of the concept of becoming, they write “becoming-imperceptible.”

The writer Chris Kraus quotes Deleuze for the sentence: “Life is not personal,” in her book, I Love Dick. That idea is incredibly liberating, which Kraus’ work illustrates because the individual life isn’t just about itself; there is always room for becoming someone else.

To put it more simply, identities are fiction.

Using Iris Murdoch’s concept, contemporary society needs a little dose of “unselfing” to improve the world. “Unselfing” means I turn my attention outward, away from myself and onto the world. As a result, I will see things as they really are and not through the lens of my selfish concerns. Unfortunately, this is difficult because many people’s vision is colored by their concern and interest, Murdoch calls it the “fat relentless ego” in The Sovereignty of Good.

The best way to avoid the identity traps is to prevent craving for one.

Ja, vi bør glemme …

Det er på tide, at det enkelte menneske glemmer alle guruerne for derved at se sin egen virkelighed, se sit eget liv, skabe sin egen historie.

Sådan åbner jeg en kronik, der bl.a. handler om psykologen Svend Brinkmann, lidt om Freud, en anelse mere om Deleuze og om at handle således, at du kan gentage dine handlinger.

Læs kronikken her.

The rites of play

“Play, not work, is the end of life. To participate in the rites of play is to dwell in the Kingdom of Ends. To participate in work, career, and the making of history is to labor the Kingdom of Means.” – Michael Novak, The Joy of Sports (1976)

Byung-Chul Han is a Korean-born professor of philosophy and cultural studies at the University of the Arts in Berlin as well as a popular contemporary social analyst. During the last two decades, he has published numerous book-length essays dissecting contemporary society. Han uses several catchy terms to define contemporary society, including  burnout, tired, positive, pornographic, intimate, transparent, control and information society to name a few.

His essays draw a dualistic map, that is good vs. bad, and the distinction can, at times, have an either–or character, for example, seduction versus porn, knowledge versus information, negative versus positive, consumers versus users, etc. In his newest book, titled The Disappearance of Rituals, Han turns to rituals to overcome the erosion of community. As symbolic acts, Han suggests that rituals can bring closure. Han also looks to rituals to “stabilize life” and make “life last.”

According to Han, closure and stability are needed because everything has been “colonized by the economic.” He observes that “in consuming emotions we do not relate to things but to ourselves. What we seek is emotional authenticity. Thus, the consumption of emotions strengthens the narcissistic relationship with ourselves.” Thus, the corrosion of community is related to narcissism. 

Han illustrates the ever-present narcissism that can be found even in so-called positive movements or slogans that focus on change: change yourself by doing this, change the world by buying or consuming this product. The problem is two-sided: to walk around in a vegan t-shirt or shoes requires money, and second, all that matters is the symbolic value. However, having a Buddha statue in your garden does not really bring people together or bring you any closer to having true insight. The problem is that some symbols have become shallow. They don’t “establish relations, only connections.” 

Han doesn’t use the concept of authenticity in an existential way but sees it as a neoliberal concept of production. “You exploit yourself voluntarily in the belief that you are realizing yourself.” Or, when everyone “is producing him- or herself in order to garner more attention … the compulsion of self-production leads to a crisis of community.” The crisis is characterized by “echo chambers,” where people mainly hear the voices of those who share their beliefs and opinions.

Thus, communication without community is compulsive and narcissistic, whereas rituals consist of “narrative processes.” Another way of describing the corrosion of communities is that contemporary rituals have become “as-if-rituals,” in other words, shallow. 

The rituals that Han refers to aim to stabilize identity, to make one “at home in the world.” He refers to the Hungarian writer Péter Nádas who describes a village with an ancient pear tree at the centre, which for Han is an example of “a ritually closed place”. Under the pear tree the villagers gather and contemplate silently. In his work, Nádas unfolds a collective consciousness that “creates a community without communication.”  

Han is aware that his ideas are closely related to modern-day nationalism, but with the help of Hegel, he claims that the “spirit is a closure, an enclosing power which, however, incorporates the other” but without changing the culture that Han sees as something original, fixed and even sacred. For the same reason, he postulates that societies seek closure, or a clear identity, which for him is a “society of rules,” where such “rules rest on agreement.” Yet he doesn’t explore the difficulties in establishing rules in societies inhabited by narcissistic cultural, racial, gender, and other group identities. He paints his critique with broad strokes and, equally vaguely, states: “We must defend an ethics of beautiful forms.” 

The kind of rituals that Han proposes are rituals of closure, for example, religious festivals. For the same reason, he claims that culture unfortunately has been made profane. For Han, “culture is a form of closure, and so founds an identity.” 

I would disagree with him and claim that a closed cultural identity is a fiction. Cultures change, yet Han is persistent, for instance, when he sees danger in Deleuze’s and Guattaris’s concepts of becoming and rhizome. Unlike the two French philosophers, Han operates with a metaphysics of being. Again, I would disagree with Han by suggesting that the problem of today is related to an idealized or normative notion of being, and the result is that most people seek the same thing and do the same thing to gain attention, prestige and status or to gain followers and likes (cf. the echo chambers). There is a lack of critical thinking because people would rather feel protected and at home, that is, identified. Finally, when Deleuze and Guattari speak about becoming, it is never about the point from which something originates (e.g., cultural identity) or the point at which it arrives. Their concept of becoming is closer to “play,” which Han leans toward at the end of his book, perhaps to overcome the risk of appearing too nostalgic in his urge for rituals.

In Homo Ludens (1955), Johan Huizinga summarizes play as “free activity … an activity connected with no material interest … a voluntary activity.” Play is intrinsically valued. Later, with the Enlightenment, play was contrasted with work. Work was serious, play was unserious—a waste of time. Still, some philosophers suggest otherwise—and here Han could have improved his book by consulting more recent literature about sport and philosophy. 

Yet, to gain closure in Han’s argument, readers might be curious about what play can offer. “Thinking has the character of play” because there is no thinking without eros—or joy and freedom, I would add. 

Play is related to seduction, and with this concept, Han succeeds in tying play to rituals as something exterior, something that is repeated as when Kierkegaard’s seducer turns up at the same place every day in Cordelia’s life. Seduction also requires dwelling or time as duration because it requires a secret—a transparent person is never seductive—because all narratives are fed by a secret story. That secret might even be related to why so many people play, or watch other people play which, according to Novak (see epigraph), might have something to do with play being real, honest, and true.

Thus, what is the secret that brings people together? Play, rituals, seduction. 

After reading a few of Han’s books, you know what to expect: more of the same. To his credit, he adds a little extra each time to stimulate new readers. In this book, it is rituals and play, although he could have spent more time exploring these concepts, especially the latter. 

Still, Han’s books can awaken an appetite for a more critical approach to society—for both students and critically orientated citizens. 

Finn Janning, PhD, philosopher and writer – review first published in Metapsychology

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