A world of “alternative facts”?

In her essay, “Truth and Politics,” the philosopher Hannah Arendt wrote: “Freedom of opinion is a farce unless factual information is guaranteed and the facts themselves are not in dispute” (all quotes from Arendt are taken from Richard J. Bernstein’s brilliant book, Why Read Hannah Arendt Now).

Let me elaborate on that by referring to the #MeToo movement; the movement is, probably, one of the most interesting—and hopefully—sustainable movements of change in recent years. What concerns me here, however, is not who has the power to tell their story—although this is important as well—but how power shapes what any true story could possibly be. In other words, it’s obvious that most reasonable people welcome that women have both the courage and power to tell their stories, and yet, we should be careful not to let the label—#MeToo—paralyze the need for critical thinking regarding what is being said.

One way of blurring the distinction between fact-based truth (factual truth) and falsehood, as Arendt mentioned, is to claim that any factual truth is just another opinion. When dealing with abuse or violence is it enough to have an opinion about whether or not someone is being abusive? Without any sense of what is a so-called factual truth or facts, we too easily move into a fictional world of “alternative facts.”

Seen in this light, the accusation toward the writer Junot Diaz—to mention one recent example—might seem to neglect this distinction between falsehood and truth. Instead, the accusers tend to represent something Arendt would call propaganda. The issue here is not whether Diaz is a good guy or a bad guy, but how the accusers framed him as an abuser “under” the power of #MeToo, regardless of the factual truth of the matter. In doing so, the accusers have not only undermined the movement, but also showed—as Arendt also predicted—that they knew that many people don’t really care if they lie. Instead, many people will admire them (bandwagon mentality) for their tactical skills in accusing a well-known writer to gain publicity for themselves, or perhaps even to sell some books. As Bernstein writes: “Factual truth-telling is frequently powerless against image-making…”

Arendt also wrote: “The result of a consistent and total substitution of lies for factual truth is not that the lies will now be accepted as truth, and the truth defamed as lies, but that the sense by which we take our bearings in the real world—and the category of truth vs. falsehood is among the mental means to this end—is being destroyed.”  The possibilities for lying become limitless and, far too often, are met with little resistance. Referring to the Junot Diaz case and #MeToo, one obvious reason for this little resistance against falsehood can be that no sane person wants to appear as if they are against equality and respect, which the #MeToo movement represents. Yet, quite paradoxically, the power of this movement comes from telling the truth; the truth that is powerful enough without being fictionalized.

Arendt noted: “What convinces the masses are not facts, not even invented facts, but only the consistency of the system of which they are presumably a part.” Assuming that #MeToo is such a system, then, like all systems, it is maintained by the culture that the users install. Here, I prefer people who play fair, that care about the truth, that are capable of putting personal agendas aside to cultivate trust, respect, and equality which, actually, is what #MeToo is all about. Following the Junot Diaz case, the accusers appear deliberately to be committing what looks like a character assassin. Why? Some suggest envy, greed, hate, and even racism as motives… I’ve no idea. All I know is that the opposite of factual truth is deliberate lying. (On a similar note, see #MeToo exists in an ethical twilight zone).

Also I know that literature can help us experience the difference between falsehood and truth, it has the potential to confront us with our moral limitations. It can stimulate our empathy and make us recognize our need for compassion. In many important ways, writers and other artists hold a mirror to society that allows it to see its ugliness and its beauty. I think, we need to keep the madness alive—through art. We need this for the sanity of humanity.

In other words, writers must dare not to follow the herd. This requires writers who doesn’t simply moralize but who risk asking the ugly, offensive questions (see e.g. All women are not angels). The artist creates, imagines, and enlarges—and sometimes that is not pretty.

What is far worse than immoral art is when people—citizens in democratic societies—don’t know the difference between falsehood or truth, or when some people don’t really care. The theme that runs through Arendt’s thinking, according to Bernstein, is “the need to take responsibility for our political lives.” Lying and responsibility, of course, doesn’t go hand in hand. It never has. Instead, Arendt showed that organized lying and fictional image-making are techniques perfected by totalitarian regimes, she showed that the banality of evil comes from our inability to think, that is to say, our inability to question, doubt, wonder, analyze, and constantly debate and clarify the relationship between power, truth, and lying. “Thinking is an activity that must be performed over and over again in order to keep it alive,” Bernstein writes in another book called Violence.

The Junot Diaz case shows that we still, all of us, have a long way to go before the world is a safer place full of trust, respect, compassion, and equality for all.

Learn to philosophize

Today, we live in a society organized mainly by capitalism. Not only is making money an objective that guides many people’s lives, but so are prestige, status, and social identity. Even when corporations claim that “people come first,” they refer to their employees’ skills and experiences as “human capital” or “cultural capital.”

Everything we do is a currency that can be counted. This problem can be seen through two concepts: power and freedom.

Today, the power that controls us (i.e. status, prestige, identity) appears invisible unless we pay very careful attention. But—and this is the problem—we rarely pay attention because that which works as an invisible or imperceptible power is also what seduces us not to pay attention.

The consequence is that we are not free. Freedom can be seen as both a problem and a possibility. It is becoming, emphasizing that we become by combining courage to stand against dominating ideals and norms with the imagination that things could be different. Thus, freedom is more than my individual liberty to do whatever I feel like doing because that neglects how everything is interconnected. Freedom is social; it’s about succeeding in creating a sustainable future—together.

Most philosophers – and this is probably no surprise – suggest that thinking is the best remedy against today’s maladies. But in order to think philosophically (i.e. reflect, contemplate, analyze) we must be capable of loving, that is, relating to others and the world with care.

Socrates is the example. He philosophized for free. And he showed that philosophy is social. Perhaps for that reason is it difficult to philosophize today when we have become too narcissistic. “The narcissistic-depressive subject only hears its own echo… Social media like Twitter and Facebook aggravate this development, they are narcissistic media,” wrote Korean philosopher Byung-Chul Han In The Swarm.

The question, therefore, is: how do we learn to pay attention?

Philosophy and mindfulness in the schools

The answer is to bring philosophy and mindfulness to schools at all levels, although my errand here is at business schools. Business is, of course, part of the current problem as well as it can become a crucial part of the solution.

Mindfulness is easy to implement as a non-religious meditation practice which helps cultivate and strengthen our capacity to pay attention. With this in mind, future leaders can with greater success make sustainable and responsible decisions that are not grounded in their own egos, or the ego of the board members. The point is to cultivate an awareness that will gradually make it desirable to make decisions on behalf of others – if for no other reason, then because we are all connected.

The combination of philosophy and mindfulness, I believe, is one the strongest assets against today’s rigid achievement society that makes many of us suffer in a way that very few people realize that they themselves are the perpetrators of their own misery. It’s also a strong tool against the current idea that transparency per se is good, although it undermines the most elementary of human relations: trust.

Still, before future leaders can act in a sustainable way, they must be aware of what is actually going on. And it is here that business schools can be part of creating a better future for all, because instead of speaking about attention and concentration, we can develop it. And once future leaders are aware, they will also question some of the models used in business.

The blogpost was originally post at Esencialblog at Toulouse Business School – Barcelona.

Compassion – Toward an Ethics of Mindfulness

This work is guided by two hypotheses with one overall objective of establishing an ethics of mindfulness . The first hypothesis is the concept of moral motivator or in- tentional moral. Both Western philosophy and mindfulness operate with an intention influenced by their moral beliefs. The second hypothesis is the relationship between moral reasoning and wisdom. That is, our reasoning is affected by our moral belief . To combine those two theses, I introduce the concept compassion from mindfulness and the ethics based on the French philosopher Gilles Deleuze. Hereby, I suggest that by practicing mindfulness, one can develop his or her capacity for compassion, but also – this practice – is a «way of life» that can help protect the planet: an ethical practice.

Read the entire paper here: Compassion – Toward an Ethics of Mindfulness.

“Compassion – Toward an Ethics of Mindfulness” is published in the journal Mindfulness & Compassion, vol. 3, issue 1.

Løgnen er demokratiets død

Filosoffen Hannah Arendt havde et skarpt blik for forholdet mellem sandhed og løgne. Hun vidste, at det, som overbeviser masserne ikke er fakta, end ikke alternative fakta, men hvor stærkt noget kan opretholde den fortælling, som nogle ynder at se sig selv igennem.

Den fortælling, som Arendt talte om, svarer til hvad vi i dag kalder identitetspolitik, hvor enhver gruppe ser sig selv som særegne, hvorved de værner om deres egen fortælling med en nidkærhed, der til tider gør dem blinde for egne mangler, eller andre menneskers ideer og tanker.

Problemet i dag er det samme, som Arendt rejste midt i det tyvende århundrede, nemlig at de fleste ikke ønsker at tænke, de foretrækker at ignorere besværlige politiske problemer, eller de tyer til klicheer og fjollerier. Det sker, når vi ryster på hovedet af Trump, og siger: ”Sikke en idiot.” Intet synes for alvor at vække vores slumrende handlekraft. Og dette er demokratisk problematisk.

Det modsatte af rationel sandhed er ignorance. Og det modsatte af en faktuel sandhed er den bevidste løgn. Det nytter altså ikke at ignorere politikere (eller andre), der lyver. Det nytter heller ikke – ganske misvisende – at kalde en løgn for en holdning, som kunne man kalde en regnefejl en holdning. Den rationelle sandhed krymper, når nogen bevidst fordrejer, undlader, overdriver eller lyver om faktuelle sandheder (se Den der råber lyver)

Politisk populisme henvender sig til befolkningens følelser; følelser, der som alt andet kan være sande eller falske, velbegrundet eller ubegrundet, fornuftige eller ufornuftige. Følelser er afhængige vores overbevisning eller tro – altså den fortælling vi ønsker at identificere os med – og ikke, hvorvidt noget er sandt eller falsk.

Måske det hele kan summeres igennem Arendts spørgsmål: ”Hvordan sker det onde?” (se  Are We Thinking?) Det sker ikke fordi vi er dumme, sagde hun. Snarere på grund af mangel på omtanke og ubesindighed. Ren og skær dovenskab og ligegyldighed.

Et politisk og socialt engagement kæver en vilje til sandheden, fordi dette engagement skaber fremtidens fundament.

#MeToo exists in an ethical twilight zone

What do we think about when we think of the #MeToo movement? #MeToo is many things—it’s complex and conflicting; it addresses our collective memory (or lack thereof) and history; it touches upon social and economic class, religion, race, and, of course, most of all on gender. And it touches upon the glue of our society: trust.

A few weeks ago, I heard that the Boston Review had decided to keep the writer Junot Díaz on as a fiction editor. Yesterday, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) cleared Díaz of allegations of sexual misconduct and verbal abuse.

In many ways, the whole “Junot Diaz case” can be placed within the post-truth era of fake news, which again is one of ethics. For example, the journalist Ralph Keyes claims in The Post-Truth Era: Dishonesty and Deception in Contemporary Life, “Deception has become commonplace at all levels of contemporary life.” He goes on to consider that we may have reached a stage in our social evolution that is “beyond honesty.”

The era of post-truth is also an era of moralism. Everything is too easily reduced to good and bad, as if no grey areas exist. This is also part of the rigid identity politics that characterize US politics today, which far too often produce a mindless label—as if only a black person can speak against racism, a homosexual against homophobia, a woman against male abusers. Such assumptions show a lack of imagination. They also avoid staring at all the grey areas. For example, the grey areas are probably the weakest points in the otherwise powerful and very welcome #MeToo movement, in which the Junot Díaz case can be placed since it deals with a man of power accused of behaving badly.

Morality typically deals with whether something is right or wrong. However, being moral is not always the same as being right. For example, a story isn’t true because its moral is, and vice versa. Furthermore, morality is not something unchangeable; rather, it’s a social artefact. Our moral norms change as a result of new knowledge. This knowledge, of course, should be convincing, valid, reliable, and trustworthy. Unfortunately, lack of trust seems to be the protagonist in this particular case.

“Post-truthfulness exists in an ethical twilight zone,” Keyes writes. “It allows us to dissemble without considering ourselves dishonest. When our behavior conflicts with our values, what we’re most likely to do is reconceive our values.” Keyes’ point is interesting. One of Díaz’s main accusers was the writer Carmen Maria Machado, who referred to a Q & A session she had with Díaz, where she claims he was “abusive”, “bullying” and “misogynist.” However, when confronted with a recording of this particular discussion, Machado was forced to admit she had been exaggerating, saying, “I’m not a victim of Junot Díaz. I’m a female writer who had a weird interaction with him.”

Weird, of course, is not necessarily misogynist.

Why did she lie? Did she deliberately stretch her wording to fit the #MeToo vocabulary? So far, Machado has not apologized—perhaps because she is afraid of people’s hate and judgment, or afraid of losing face, or afraid of being accused of lack of empathy. Or, maybe, she doesn’t care, maybe she distrust the institutions who cleared him… no one knows. However, what’s “interesting” is that Machado’s accusations violate trust, which we all need to coexist, regardless of age, gender, religion or sexual orientation, etc.

In an essay entitled “Truth and Politics“, the philosopher Hannah Arendt wrote, “Freedom of opinion is a farce unless factual information is guaranteed and that facts themselves are not in dispute.” Truth, therefore, is not the same as having an opinion. For example, Machado might have the opinion that the she was verbally abused, but in reality she is fictionalizing the truth, or creating “alternative facts” as we call it today.

***

The Danish philosopher K.E. Løgstrup said that trust is elementary or fundamental to human existence. Would I leave my three children at a public school every morning if I didn’t trust the teachers? Would I cross the street with them if I didn’t trust people to stop their cars at a red light?

Trust binds us together. It affects marriages, friendships, parents, and society, including politicians and scientists who inform us about the ecological disasters that humans are creating. Løgstrup emphasizes that human interdependence only works if we trust one another. Trust allows me to surrender myself into the hands of another, to make myself vulnerable, because I expect a respectful, compassionate, and trustful feedback.

Therefore, when Carmen Maria Machado lied about Díaz, it was not just a little white lie. Her words impacted everyone. Not only because she accused a well-known writer but because we trusted her. Some may have been skeptical of the validity of the accusations—thinking of sensationalism, etc., but, at the same time, #MeToo taught us the importance of believing the girls and women who had come forward so courageously. For too long, the victim has suffered unnecessarily because being a victim has been associated with shame. Shame is the reason why many women (and men) and children don’t tell about abuse.

When I discovered that Machado lied and didn’t correct her words until she was confronted a month later with an audio recording of the interview, she became less believable. When she was confronted with a recording, she appears annoyed and defensive but, surprisingly, she also appears to be angry for being exposed. “Stop lecturing!” she said. “That’s what’s so fucking weird. The level of condescension.”

And this is perhaps the saddest part. It may cause people to doubt the sincerity of #MeToo. Machado’s behavior perfectly fits with our cultural acceptance of lying. As Keyes notes in The Post-Truth Era regarding the rise in the use of euphemisms for deception: “We no longer tell lies. Instead we ‘misspeak.’ We ‘exaggerate.’ We ‘exercise poor judgment.’ ‘Mistakes were made,’ we say.” It’s as if we—many, at least—have become careless of what is true or not true.

If we want to change society into something better—a society based on equality, respect, and compassion—then we must trust one another. Trust is also the foundation of critical thinking because we assume that people say what they mean for the sake of the truth, not their own agenda (read: self-serving).

We become wiser by admitting our mistakes, that is to say be accountable for our actions and words, but also by acknowledging all the grey areas when it comes to human interaction, not just between men and women but between all kinds of identities—gender, race, age, culture, beliefs, etc. Let’s not forgot that all identities are prisons. They might make us see something more clearly from our own point of view but are often blind to a lot of other aspects. Let’s not forget that men and women should be able to discuss things without fearing being labeled misogynistic. Let’s not forget that nothing is ever completely black or white. Sometimes women lie, use their power; sometimes men are falsely accused.

The great writer Terry Tempest Williams once said that she wanted to bear witness to both the beauty and pain of our world in her writing. By “bearing witness,” she said, “the story told can provide a healing ground.” With regard to the case of Machado and Díaz, healing arises if their conflict is not used to draw a deeper ravine between genders but, instead, to acknowledge that all parties have suffered, and that trust is only gained through apology and change of actions that will make the grey areas less grey.

All women are not angels

Recently, Zoë Bossiere raised some questions regarding male writers. For example—while referring to a character in Junot Diaz’s two collections of short stories, Drown and This Is How You Lose Her—she asks: Could a sexist character like Yunior have been written if not for the abuse the women in these men’s lives suffered?

“Maybe not,” she answers.

Maybe not. But just as easily, maybe.

We tend to forget that imagination is a fundamental aspect of literature and art. I find it hard to believe that all the Scandinavian women writing crime literature are murderers. I doubt that Gillian Flynn, author of “Gone Girl,” has killed her old boyfriend, or wants to. Stephen King is probably not wildly evil, or even all that mean. And Han Kang, who wrote “The Vegetarian,” might not be a vegetarian, or like to be painted naked by her sister’s husband, or even have a sister.

Bossiere goes on and ask, “Some might argue that these works [by men]contribute to the greater canon of literature, but in the era of #MeToo, how much is ‘good’ art actually worth?”

I personally feel that it is not worth s–t if someone deliberately suffers in the process. By suffering I do not mean that, say, children might suffer due to parental distraction or absentmindedness. I mean suffering in a violent and abusive way.

Yet, I agree with the Norwegian novelist Karl Ove Knausgård who has defended writers who “run up against the limit of what cannot, shall not, should not or must not be written”, arguing that every time an author “refuses to shy away”, the arbitrary nature of such limits is revealed.

It may be difficult for many to distinguish the writer from his or her work, but it is important to do so. When we too quickly equate a person’s work of fiction with the person him or herself, it shows more a lack of imagination than moral reasoning.

Readers of course have every right to become political consumers and stop reading books by writers whose actions may be reprehensible. But I know that not everyone is Mother Teresa or the Dalai Lama, and I can accept writers with flaws. I can read Jean Genet or Ulrike Meinhof (the brain behind the Baader-Meinhof Gang that operated in Germany in the 1970s), and not feel the urge to steal or kill. Sometimes the best literature can confuse us, nauseate us, show us our moral flaws as well as our ignorance.

Still, men should not be excused on the basis of their literary genius for what they do in real life. Never. The same goes for women. It is not chauvinistic in the slightest to state that all women are not angels, just as all men are not sexual predators. Writing this, however, feels like putting a rope around my neck, because gender issues, especially in the #MeToo era, have become so contentious. Today discussion of the topic is governed by a cowboy mentality, in which everyone shoots first and asks questions later.

For example, in today’s gender debate, some men and women treat one another as men and women—not as human beings. It’s as if gender gets in the way of an unbiased interpretation of what is happening. I think it’s important to acknowledge that all kinds of judgement—about right and wrong, true or false—require time, reflection, and analysis. Today, perhaps due to social media—especially Twitter—it’s easy to contribute blindly. There is a strong herd mentality on social media.

Do we take time to dwell, to reflect, to add perspective, to provide nuance? Or do we just blame? And when we blame, are we doing so out of instinct, out of some latent hatred? And do people—writers included—consider what kind of words they are using to blame other human beings? For example, the term misogynist has become so popular and broadly used that it soon will lose its meaning.

The philosopher Kate Manne defines misogyny as not about hatred toward women but about controlling and pushing women who challenge male dominance. The crucial aspect is how men and women challenge one another—that is, whether the dialogue conveys respect, trust, and equality. In the literary and academic world, people will often defend their ideas or positions. Sometimes people do this with respect and care, other times with hostility. Sometimes it’s women being hostile; sometimes it’s men. Sometimes hostility is due to vanity, arrogance, insecurity, or plain stupidity, and sometimes it’s due to men (or women) being afraid of losing their powerful positions to women—or other men.

A recent example is a recording of a Q and A session with writers Junot Diaz and Carmen Maria Machado, during which Machado describes Diaz as a misogynist and a bully. To me, this interpretation seems wrong, but according to Manne, it’s the potential victim who defines whether Diaz is securing his power or not. And then, of course, we can interpret Machado’s actions and words, words she probably—being a writer—chose deliberately. Nietzsche said thinking is interpretation. It’s an ongoing process, and I would be very careful about labeling Diaz misogynist only on this recording or Machado a liar. Which leaves us where? Perhaps we are witnessing a power game fueled by both historical and current frustration, irritation, and hate—a situation where fiction and nonfiction merge, a situation where we no longer read novels based on their literary qualities but morally on whether the character is a good human being.

In an essay published in The New Yorker, Toni Morrison writes: “The choices made by white men, who are prepared to abandon their humanity out of fear of black men and women, suggest the true horror of lost status.” In other words, perhaps many of the problems debated today are not only about gender but much more about power.

We tend to forget that all human beings are worth the same when we focus too much on gender, skin color, or socioeconomic status. I know there is good reason for doing so (cf. Morrison’s essay on white men); still, the challenge is to encounter the present moment with an open and neutral mind full of compassion.

In short, in this quest for living equally and respectfully together, I think it is crucial that we all keep our heads cool and our hearts warm.

A note on identity politics

I concur with the point that, sometimes, the treatment of certain groups can be so cruel and unfair that you need to confront the opponent head-on, for example, the manner in which women (and men) are confronting the patriarchal culture that does not only characterize the business and academic worlds, but also, and to a greater extent, religious societies. This point is, indeed, urgent and highly welcomed.

Still, I think that the concept of identity politics is problematic. In A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari use the concept of the rhizome to illuminate the distinctiveness and connectivity of the multiple factors that constitute reality. “A rhizome has no beginning or end; it is always in the middle, between things, interbeing, intermezzo. The tree is filiation, but the rhizome is alliance, uniquely alliance,” they write. This concept helps us view our lives as assemblages or a mixture of words, institutions, social movements, and countless other things that, while related, are also distinct.

For example, in The Trouble with Unity, the philosopher Cristina Beltrán uses Deleuze’s concept of the rhizome to address some of the problems with identity politics. Using a simple example, she mentions the conception of Latinidad, i.e., the notion that all people from Latin America share the same group identity and cultural consciousness. She notes that many commentators tend to assume that Latinos represent a collective identity. Really? Didn’t people read Edward Said’s work? (e.g. his book Orientalism)

A similar appraisal can be observed for various minority groups, which are assumed to be special or unique instead of the more accurate assertion that we are all different people. The problem with identity politics is that it is tantamount to arborescent thinking. At its worst, arborescent thinking can suppress any other identity: men versus women, white versus black, and vegetarian versus non-vegetarian. Identity politics can also create a culture of victimization—something I often witness in Catalonia, Spain. For more than a generation, schools and politicians in Catalonia have fed the people the idea that they are not part of Spain, that Spain steals from them, and that all problems are caused by Spain. The result is that very few Catalan separatists (not Catalans per se) are prepared to take responsibility or are held accountable for their own actions, as Spain is used as a scapegoat.

Critical thinking and self-reflection, therefore, are arguably rare among people who cling to certain identities as a moral refuge. This is probably related to how convenient a certain position or identity can appear, as if by being feminist, existentialist, Catalan, black, or homosexual, we are, in any way, morally better.

Personally, I believe that Deleuze’s concept of the rhizome can help us find and create value in what takes place without being placed into fixed boxes of identity. I urge for a  more humble and inclusive approach. After all, all identities are prisons hindering us to think freely. Or as Michel Foucault once said: What does it matter who is speaking? It only matters because of hierarchies, domination, and a simple lack of equality and imagination.

What is needed is not more identity politics, but what Deleuze called non-communication, “circuit breakers” that may elude communicative control, whereby people blindly say and do what they do because this is what other people do. There is a scary herd mentality among people who cling onto certain identities.

In short: I can’t really identify 100 percent with any particular identity; however, I can empathize and care for all people.

Originally posted as a comment on the APA Philosophy Blog — (you may wish to check out the link for references to articles on identity politics, and other interesting stuff).

Og helvede?

»Og helvede?,« spørger journalisten Mónica Maristain den chilenske forfatter Roberto Bolaño, og han svarer: »Det er ligesom Ciudad Juárez, vores forbandelse og spejl, en foruroligende refleksion af vores frustrationer, og af vores berygtede fortolkning af frihed og af vores begær.«

Læs mit essay Hver eneste forbandet ting er vigtig i anledning af Roberto Bolaños fødselsdag i 1953.

Den der råber lyver

“This is the lesson that history teaches: repetition.”
Gertrude Stein

Fornylig skrev jeg en kronik i Information, der handlede om journalistikkens rolle i en postfaktuel verden. Kronikken medførte, som det engang imellem sker, at jeg modtog Lea Korsgaards pamflet: Den der råber lyver.

Korsgaard, der er chefredaktør på Zetland og forfatter til tre bøger beskriver i pamfletten, hvordan journalistikken tidligere havde den nøgne journalist, som ideal. En journalist, der ukritisk viderebragte informationer uden at tjekke, om disse var sande, relevante, væsentlige m.v. I stedet for den nøgne journalist, taler Korsgaard om, at en journalist bør være klædt på til finderspidserne. ”Med viden og kløgt.”

Ordet kløgt refererer bl.a. til Aristoteles’ begreb phronesis; en praktisk fornuft, der modsat en mere intellektuel og abstrakt fornuft kræver, at journalisten får jord under sine negle. Den kløgtige journalist graver i fakta, uddyber, nuancerer, hvorved denne ikke kun formidler, men også etablerer et fundament, hvor samfundets borgere kan se sandheden i øjnene. Hvis alt er tvivlsom eller direkte løgn, mister vi ethvert samfunds fundament: tilliden.

Jeg læste denne lille pamflet samtidig med at jeg i El Pais læste en artikel, der hævdede, at pamfletten har genvundet sin popularitet. Pamfletten kan – qua sin størrelse – bringe den intellektuelle ind i samfundsdebatten, her og nu. En pamflet er et aktuelt nedslag; en optimering eller kvalificering af debatten, hvilket Den der råber lyver, lever op til.

Artiklen i El Pais nævner bl.a. den spanske forfatter Eduardo Mendozas pamflet Hvad sker der i Catalonien, og filosoffen Fernando Savaters pamflet Mod separatisme. Sidstnævnte beskriver, hvor skadelige de catalanske separatisters kamp er – rent demokratisk og medmenneskeligt – fordi de både eliminerer fornuften og borgerbegrebet. De catalanske separatister, skriver Savater, tilsidesætter loven, mens de lader følelserne drive gæk med dem, skønt disse følelser ofte ikke har belæg i noget sandt. Eller de lader loven favorisere dem, der mener det samme, som dem selv, hvilket jo strider imod lovens opgave, der bør behandle alle lige.

Der råbes meget i Spanien, men mest af alt blandt de catalanske separatister. De eksemplificerer glimrende Korsgaards titel. Så det var både med glæde og irritation, at jeg læste Korsgaards pamflet: Glæde, fordi den er relevant; irritation, fordi den kastede mig tilbage i en debat, som jeg ellers havde besluttet mig, at forlade. (Jeg har tidligere skrevet artiklerne: Grumset catalansk nationalisme (2014), Catalonien mellem frihed og kontrol (2017), om manglen på medfølelse i essayet Compassion in Catalonia, om hvordan hadet til Spanien bevæger sig fra catalanske forældre til deres børn i essayet The Boy in the Classroom, om den psykiske terror i kommentarerne Cataloniens separatister udøver psykisk vold mod sine modstandere og Cataloniens frihedskamp er endt i undertrykkelse).

Og nu er jeg her igen! Det catalanske projekt er ikke et fysisk voldeligt projekt, men mentalt kontrollerende og manipulerende. De, der ikke har blik for det, lever stadigvæk i Michel Foucaults Disciplinærsamfund, hvor mennesket opdrages i lukkede systemer: børnehave, skole, arbejdsplads, fængsler, etc. I dag lever vi snarere i det Gilles Delueze kaldte et Kontrolsamfund. Her er der ingen tydelige grænser, hvorfor vi også nemmere forfører og kontrollerer os selv. Det gør vi, fordi vi gerne vil passe ind (eller undgå eksklusion), opnå social anerkendelse eller identitet m.v. I praksis betyder det, at vi bliver offer for vores egne gerninger. Præcis ligesom, når mange ukritisk deler alt på nettet, hvorefter de forbløffes over, at al denne information måske anvendes af nogle.

Det, som præger de catalanske separatister er, hvad organisationsteoretikere kalder ”groupthink.” De ophøjer egen moral, mens de gør sig resistente overfor enhver kritik. Dette hænger sammen med udviklingen af en forførerende diskurs, som de catalanske politikere i årevis har tvangsfodret deres boger med.

For det første, selvom de lever godt i Catalonien, kan de leve endnu bedre, fortælles det,  hvis bare de slipper af med Spanien. Spanien stjæler jo! For det andet, de catalanske separatister skal aldrig stå til ansvar for deres fejl og mangler, fordi de har altid Spanien at bebrejde. Det betyder, at de catalanske separatister har skabt en offer-kultur uden et konkret etisk fundament, der jo kræver evnen til at stå til regnskab for ens egne gerninger, som Kierkegaard har sagt.

Resultatet er, at Catalonien for separatisterne er blevet en slags utopi, hvilket jeg har skrevet om i kronikken Catalonierne opfører sig som en selvretfærdig part i et ægteskabelig krise. En utopi er det gode sted, som ikke er. Et sted, der begæres, idet det henter næring i sit udtalte had til Spanien, mens de drømmer om frihed og demokrati. Dog ikke demokrati forstået som en tredeling af magten, da de catalanske separatister gerne arbejder tæt sammen med politiet. Det er nu heller ikke demokrati, forstået som en organisering af uenighed, hvilket er filosoffen Jacques Ranciéres definition, idet de, som er uenige ignoreres eller, per automatik, kaldes fascister. Eksempel er der flere spaniere, der ønsker at bevæge sig fra et monarki til en republik, flere (rigtig mange), som finder Rajoys regering inkompetent, etc. Her kunne der sagtens etableres et samarbejde på tværs af alle Spaniens regioner, men det er svært, fordi præmissen jo er, at det er Spaniens skyld. Ligeledes er der flere catalanske journalister og kunstnere, der har forladt regionen, fordi de ikke var tilhængere af catalansk uafhængighed, hvorfor de ikke kunne finde arbejde, de blev udstødt m.v.

Med hensyn til frihed, så handler det jo ikke kun om, at blive fri fra Spanien, hvilket i praksis betyder, fri fra at tage del i et demokratiske arbejde, fx den grundlov, som de selv har underskrevet. Frihed handler eksempelvis også om, at være fri til at skabe nye veje, der ikke bare går destruktivt imod, men som snarere innovativt og kreativt går imod, idet nye alternativer skabes. Det kreative og innovative mangler. Personligt oplever jeg, at Barcelona de seneste ti år er blevet mere provinsiel og mindre radikal, idet megen kritik ender i en karikatur, hvor alt kendes på forhånd: Spanien er ond, de catalanske separatister er gode. Selvom enkelte slagord dukker op, såsom feminisme og økologi, så udleves de ikke mere her, end andre steder i verden, hvor de også er efterspurgte. I Madrid er der progressive øko-feminister, for eksempel.

Der mangler i Spanien og Catalonien, det, som Korsgaard kalder en lidenskabelig etisk journalist. En, der fasterholder, ”at kendsgerninger er mere værd end anekdoter.”

Anekdoter om Spaniens fascistiske historier er der nok af, men kendsgerningen er, at den spanske borgerkrig sluttede i Madrid, hvor den største modstand mod Franco var; kendsgerningen er, at flere cataloniere hyldede Franco for hans religiøse familieværdier; kendsgerningen er, at den tidligere catalanske præsident Puyol, ønskede immigranter til Catalonien, der ikke talte spansk, fordi de så ville lære catalansk; kendsgerningen er, at den catalanske sprogpolitik får Dansk folkeparti til at fremstå, som de mest kærlige; kendsgerningen er, at de catalanske skoler accepterer stærke politiske symboler og retorik, fx som når forældre hænger bannere eller balloner på skolen fuld af slagord; kendsgerning er, at medier slet ikke viste Marlene Winds debat med Puigdemont i fjernsynet, de viste blot en statsmand, der ukritisk indtog Danmark, etc.

I stedet for ukritisk, at løbe med den forførerende retorik, kunne en turist i Catalonien spørge sig selv, om folket her virkelig lider, om de lever i en diktatorstat, etc. Under borgerkrigen kunne Cataloniere ikke samles i grupper på mere end fire-fem personer, i dag vandrer de rundt i gaderne, hvilket jo netop understreger, at der er demokrati.

Det er kompliceret, men ikke mere komplekst, end der er tale om en veludført strategi, der udfældes i medier og til dels i skoler og familier. Filosoffen Victoria Camp taler om mental manipulation, hvor Spanien gradvist er blevet elimineret fra den kollektive catalanske bevidsthed. Hun nævner sågar, hvordan hendes egen børn blev manipuleret i skolen. Dette projekt går flere år tilbage. Når jeg taler med unge studerende i Barcelona (dette er ikke et videnskabeligt studie, men baseret på samtaler med 13-15 forskellige drenge og piger i alderen 1-20 år, som alle er uafhængighedstilhængere), og spørger dem: Hvorfor vil I uafhængighed? Svarer de prompte: Spanien er fascistisk. Når jeg så siger: Virkelig! Hvorfor vil I uafhængighed? Svarer de: Jamen sådan var det i min familie, i skolen var holdningen gerne sådan, at Spanien var de onde…

Journalistikken må vedblive at være ”fællesskabets trykte dagbog,” citerer Korsgaard sociologen Robert E. Park for at sige. Denne dagbog mangler i Catalonien, hvilket jo selvfølgelig er hele Spaniens ansvar. De mangler generelt en forsoningsproces a la den, som Mandela foretog i Sydafrika. Det er pga. uvidenhed, at løgne, manipulationer og hadet, har det så nemt. Helt simpelt, som en buddhist munk engang har sagt, hvis du forstår, så hader du ikke. Jeg tror reelt ikke, at catalanske separatister forstår den spanske historie i al dens uperfekthed og storhed; den historie, som de selv er en del af. Ligesom mange i Spanien ikke forstår den frustration og det mindreværdskompleks – der præger mange i Catalonien – med tiden er blevet til had og arrogance.

Spanien er et demokrati, et ungt og skrøbeligt demokrati, men at kalde Spanien for Franco-land er ligeså forrykt, som at kalde Tyskland for Hitler-land. Modsat af hvad der forefindes i Catalonien, så er der en kritisk debat i Spanien – også af præsidenten Rajoy. I Catalonien behandler separatisterne, der ellers kommer fra vildt forskellige partier, alle Puigdemont som paven, fordi de deler et had. De catalanske separatister har skabt en religion, hvor objektet ikke er en kærlig Gud, men et had til Spanien. Dette er bekymrende uanset, hvor relevant meget af kritikken af regeringen i Madrid, så end er.

Og på den måde gentager historien sikkert sig selv. Michel Serres har skrevet om, hvordan Romerriget blev bygget på død og had. Modsat Gandhis fantastiske ikkevolds strategi, så har de catalanske separatister intet imod at lyve. At lyve bevidst er, mener jeg, noget ganske voldsomt, fordi det undergraver respekt og tillid, som politikerne og medierne burde skabe. Tillid og mellemmenneskelig respekt er to ting, som der ikke er meget af p.t. i Catalonien.

Min italienske ven og filosof, som er bosiddende her i Barcelona, frygter et nyt Jugoslavien, selv frygter jeg ikke …, men jeg håber, at journalistikken bliver endnu bedre, end den er.

Lea Korsgaards pamflet er et glimrende sted at begynde.

We’re All Accountable

… From my essay on sexism, morality, identity politics, and compassion:

“I remember Rebecca Solnit saying something about men being the problem—not all men, but men. And she’s almost right. Because men, as philosopher Simone de Beauvoir said about women, aren’t born men; they become men. Weinstein didn’t come into this world as a sick misogynist. He, like all those like him, was formed by the culture in which he was brought up.

Luckily, I think, I spent a lot of time with my mother and my sister. Yet, many small boys spend time with their mothers, and less time with their fathers … or, at least, they used to. Does this mean that even women—some mothers—are favouring their sons? Encouraging them to see themselves as better than girls? Telling their daughters to passively obey?”

Read the entire essay here.

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